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DETERMINATION OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
FOR PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS
It is well established that products liability actions may be maintained
within admiralty jurisdiction.' The plaintiff may derive several benefits from
having such an action in admiralty jurisdiction. For example, he has available
a federal forum without any requirement of diversity of citizenship or minimum
amount in controversy.' In addition, whether the action is in federal or state
court, it will be governed by the general maritime law. 3
 One advantage of the
Pan-Alaska Fisheries, inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1134
(9th Cir. 1977); JIG the Third Corp. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 519 F.2d 171,
175 (5th Cir. 1975); Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631, 635 (8th Cir.
1972); Schaeffer v. Michigan-Ohio Navigation Co., 416 F.2d 217, 221 (6th Cir. 1969); Best v.
Honeywell, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 269, 271.72 (D. Conn. 1980); Anglo Eastern Bulkships Ltd. v.
Ameron, Inc., 1979 A.M.C. 459, 461-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), motion for reargument denied, 460 F.
Supp. 1212, 1979 A.M.C. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
2
 28 U.S.C. 5 1333 (1976). That statute provides in relevant part that "Nile district
courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they
are otherwise entitled." 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976).
The availability of the federal forum stems from the provision in article III of the Con-
stitution that the judicial power of the United States "shall extend . . to all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction . . ." U.S. CONST. art. III , 5 2, cl. 2. Decisions interpreting the
congressional implementation of that constitutional grant of jurisdiction have estabished that cer-
tain maritime causes of action can be brought only in the federal district courts under admiralty
jurisdiciton, but that others can be brought (1) in state courts, (2) in federal district courts under
diversity jurisdiction, or (3) in federal district courts under admiralty jurisdiction. Leon v.
Galceran, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 185, 188 (1870). The federal district courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction of certain maritime causes of action created by federal statute and of the traditional
maritime action in rem against a vessel. Id. For actions in personam — suits against a named
natural or corporate person, asserting a personal liability — the plaintiff has the choice of state
court, federal district court under diversity jurisdiction — should there be diversity and the req-
uisite amount in controversy — or federal district court under admiralty jurisdiction. See id. An
action against the manufacturer of a product is of the latter in personam variety. Thus, the plaintiff
in such an action has a choice of forums.
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 (1953). Concerning the effect of
choice of admiralty law as opposed to law of a state, see Van Harville v. Johns-Manville Products
Corp., No. 78-642-H (D. Ala. Sept. 27, 1979), in which defendant preferred application of
Alabama law because of its stringent statute of limitations and doctrine of contributory negli-
gence. The court pointed out that the choice of law problem was a two-edged sword for the plain-
tiffs, because punitive damages are almost never recognized in admiralty. Id.
Although the plaintiff does have the opportunity to bring his action in federal or state
court, that choice of forum does not affect, or in theory should not affect, the choice of applicable
law. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 238, 243-45 (1942); Chelentis v. Luckenbach
S.S. Co., Inc., 247 U.S. 372, 384 (1918). The Constitution contains no explicit indication as to
the substantive law to be applied to cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. G. GILMORE &
C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 45 (2d ed. 1975). Decisions of the Supreme Court have
held that the substantive law to be applied consists of two components: (1) the body of traditional
rules and concepts governing maritime matters adopted by the courts from European authorities
and subsequently adapted to fit the needs of this country, and (2) acts of Congress altering and
supplementing the maritime law. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 574-77 (1874). If a
federal maritime rule of law — judge-made or statutory — exists that is applicable to an issue
arising in a maritime action, it must be applied whether the action is litigated in state or federal
court. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S 239, 245 (1942).
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application of that law is that the timeliness of the action will be determined,
not by a statute of limitations, but by the doctrine of laches.' Under that doc-
trine, there is no fixed period of time after which an action is barred.' The
court looks at the particular circumstances presented by each case. 6
In order to obtain the benefits of the federal forum and of the application
of maritime law, the plaintiff must establish that admiralty jurisdiction has
been properly invoked. The jurisdictional test for products liability cases, as for
all maritime tort cases, has changed within the last ten years. For more than
150 years, the courts had made a determination of admiralty jurisdiction over
torts' by the so-called locality test. The test had been enunciated in De Lovio o.
Boit' by Justice Story, an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, rendering a
decision on circuit in 1815. 9 Under that test, the mere locality of a tort — the
occurrence of harm upon the navigable waters — was sufficient to bring it
within admiralty jurisdiction.") By dictum in The Plymouth," a case decided in
1865, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the validity of such a
test, stating that "[e]very species of tort, however occurring, and whether on
board a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty
The Key City, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 653, 660 (1871).
Id.
6 Id. State statutes of limitaitons for analogous situations are considered but are not
conclusive. Czaplicki v. The Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525, 533 (1956). The determination
should be made after consideration of all the circumstances bearing on the issue. Id.
For the suit to be barred by laches, there must have been both unreasonable delay in
the filing of the claim and consequent prejudice to the party against whom suit is brought. Akers
v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 344 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 1965); see Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 373 U.S. 206, 215 (1963). An example of prejudice would be the loss of witnesses. See
Akers v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 344 F.2d 217, 221 (5th Cir. 1964). The emphasis is increas-
ingly on the extent of the prejudice rather than on the delay. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. C/B
Mr. Kim, 345 F.2d 45, 50 (5th Cir. 1965).
The emphasis on prejudice as an element necessary for the barring of an action by
laches emerged during the 1960's, when district courts found their dismissals on the ground of
unexcused delay reversed and the cases remanded for further proceedings on the question
whether the delay had been prejudicial to the defendant. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW
OF ADMIRALTY 772-73 (2d ed. 1975). The distinct shift in the handling of the laches problem
may be viewed as connected with the Supreme Court's vast expansion of seamen's remedies,
which had been initiated during the 1940's. Id. at 773.
In admiralty, an action for the negligent design and/or manufacture of a product is a
tort action. See, e.g., Moser v. Texas Trailer Corp., 623 F.2d 1006, 1013 (5th Cir. 1980) and Best
v. Honeywell, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 269, 272 (D. Conn. 1980). See generally Comment, Maritime
Products Liability: Tort and Contract Considerations Affectingjurisdiction, 52 TEMPLE L.Q. 283 (1979).
a 7 F. Cas. 418, 444 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3,776).
6 D. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM 28 n.3 (1970).
De Lovio v. Boit held that policies of marine insurance are within the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction of the United States. 7 F. Cas. 418, 444 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3,776).
The Supreme Court praised Justice Story's opinion highly in Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S.
(11 Wall.) 1, 35 (1870).
36 7 F. Cas. at 444.
" 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865). The Court held that when a vessel lying at a wharf
caught fire and the fire spread to buildings on the wharf, an action by the owners of the buildings
against the owners of the vessel did not lie within admiralty jurisdiction. Id. at 35, 37.
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cognizance." ' 2 Despite some doubts as to whether there ought to be a maritime
nexus, that dictum was taken literally by the lower courts."
The test derived from De Lovio v. Boit and The Plymouth requiring merely
occurrence of harm upon navigable waters to bring a tort action within ad-
miralty jurisdiction, was modified in 1972 by the Supreme Court's decision in
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland.' 4 From that decision lower federal
courts have derived a locality-plus test, one requiring maritime locality of harm
plus a significant connection with traditional maritime activity." That test has
been held applicable to all maritime tort actions," including products liability
actions," although the decision did not involve products liability. 18 Application
of the locality-plus test, however, can lead to questionable results. For exam-
ple, in 1980, the Fifth Circuit in Sperry Rand Corporation v. Radio Corporation of
America, 19
 extended admiralty jurisdiction to an action against the manufac-
turer of small component parts used in almost every type of electronic industry. 20
The parts in question had not been manufactured specifically for incorporation
in marine systems, but they allegedly had caused damage to a ship on navigable
waters. 2 '
This note will address the issues and problems presented by the locality-
plus test for admiralty jurisdiction used by the courts in products liability cases.
Since that test is derived from Executive Jet, the note first will examine the hold-
ing of the Court in that case, and will focus on the principles underlying that
holding. Next, it will analyze several federal court cases purporting to apply
that test in the maritime products liability area. They will be examined for
compliance with the test of Executive Jet and with the purposes for which ad-
miralty jurisdiction exists. It will be submitted that any inclusion of locality as a
factor in the test for admiralty jurisdiction over products liability cases leads to
" Id. at 36.
13 McCune, Maritime Products Liability, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 1131, 834 (1967).
See, e.g., Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758, 761 (3d Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963) (airplane crash on navigable waters); Davis v. City of Jacksonville
Beach, 251 F. Supp. 327, 328 (M.D. Fla. 1965) (collision between surfboard and swimmer);
Madole v. Johnson, 241 F. Supp. 379, 380 (W.D. La. 1965) (motorboat accident on lake).
14 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
16 See, e.g., Moser v. Texas Trailer Corp., 623 F.2d 1006, 1009 (5th Cir. 1980); Kelly
v. United States, 531 F.2d 1144, 1146 (2d Cir. 1976); T. J. Falgout Boats, Inc. v. United States,
508 F.2d 855, 856 (9th Cir. 1974); St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973, 977 (8th Cir.
1974); Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520, 525 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. , Chicot Land Co. v.
Kelly, 416 U.S. 969 (1974); Gilmore v. Witschorek, 411 F. Supp. 491, 492 (E.D. III. 1976);
Clinton Bd. of Park Comm'rs v. Claussen, 410 F. Supp. 320, 322-23 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Ham-
mill v. Olympic Airways, S.A., 398 F. Supp. 829, 832-33 (D.D.C. 1975); Kayfetz v. Walker,
404 F. Supp. 75, 76 (D. Conn. 1975); Rubin v. Power Authority, 356 F. Supp. 1169, 1170
(W.D.N.Y. 1973).
16 See cases cited at note 15 supra.
" See, e.g., Moser v. Texas Trailer Corp., 623 F.2d 1006, 1009 (5th Cir. 1980).
'a See 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
19 618 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1980).
2° Id. at 321, 322.
21 Id.
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inconsistent and anomalous results. For that reason, a new approach will be
suggested. This note will propose a test based solely on the presence of signifi-
cant connection with traditional maritime activity, so that the test may best
serve the purposes for which admiralty jurisdiction exists.
I. THE EXECUTIVE JET TEST FOR THE DETERMINATION OF
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION OVER TORT ACTIONS
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Clevelanc122 arose from the crash of a jet
aircraft. 23 The planned flight was to have been over land from Cleveland,
Ohio, to Portland, Maine, and thence to White Plains, New York." The plane
struck a flock of seagulls as it was taking off from a Cleveland airport adjacent
to Lake Erie." As a result, the plane lost its power, crashed, and ultimately
sank in the navigable waters of Lake Erie, a short distance from the airport. 26
The owners of the airplane brought a suit in federal court under admiralty
jurisdiction for property damage to the aircraft as a result of negligence. 27 De-
fendants were the airport manager, the air traffic controller, and the City of
Cleveland, which owned and operated the airport." Plaintiffs asserted that the
defendants had failed through negligence to keep the runway free of the birds
or to warn of the birds' presence."
The district court held that the action was not within admiralty jurisdic-
tion." The court stated that the alleged negligence toward the plane had hap-
pened while it was over the land.." Thus, the locality where the wrong occurred
was not over navigable waters. 32 Furthermore, the district court, relying on
Sixth Circuit precedent," held that even if the locality had been maritime, the
wrong bore no relationship to maritime service, navigation, or commerce. 34
" 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
23 Id. at 250.
2 + Id.
23 Id. The seagulls had been on the runway before the plane took off. Id. As the plane
took off, the seagulls rose into the airspace directly ahead of it. Id.
26 Id. The almost total loss of power was caused by ingestion of the birds into the jet
engines. Id. There were no personal injuries, but the plane itself was a total loss. Id.
27 Id. at 250-51.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 251.
s° Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 251-52.
" Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967). The plain-
tiff in Chapman had sued in federal court under admiralty jurisdiction for injuries sustained when
he dove off a pier into approximately eighteen inches of water. Id. at 963. The court said that the
occurrence of the tort on navigable waters was immaterial to a meaningful invocation of admiral-
ty jurisdiction. Id. at 966. The court held that in addition to locality there must be some relation-
ship between the wrong and maritime service, navigation, or commerce. Id.
34 409 U.S. at 251.
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The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, but on the ground that the
alleged tort had taken place over the land. 35
 That court did not find it necessary
to consider the question of maritime relationship. 36
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the ques-
tion whether the action lay within federal admiralty jurisdiction. 37
 The unani-
mous holding38
 of the Executive jet Court was that, in the absence of a federal
statute to the contrary, there is no federal admiralty jurisdiction over aviation
tort claims arising from flights by land-based aircraft between points within the
continental United States." This holding has been interpreted as requiring
maritime locality plus a significant relationship between the injury and tradi-
tional maritime activity in order to establish admiralty jurisdiction over a tort
action . 4°
As the first reason for its holding that significant relationship with tradi-
tional maritime activity is required, the Court stated that the requirement is
"consistent with the history and purpose of admiralty." 4 ' That purpose is to
handle the problems of vessels moving on the waterways. 42
 It is to address such
problems that the body of maritime law has developed. 43
 That body of law has
35 Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 448 F.2d 151, 154 (6th Cir. 1971).
." Id.
" 409 U.S. at 252.
38 Justice Stewart delivered the opinion. Id. at 230.
39
 409 U.S. at 274. As an example of legislation to the contrary, the Court mentioned
the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-767. Section 761 provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or
default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any
State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United
States, the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for
damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive
benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative
against the vessel, person or corporation which would have been liable if death had
not ensued.
This statute gives federal admiralty courts jurisdiction over suits for wrongful death
arising out of aircraft crashes into high seas beyond one marine league of shore. Execulive jet, 409
U.S. at 274 n.26.
41' E.g., Sperry Rand Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 618 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1980);
JIG the Third Corp. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 519 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1975);
Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1977), reo'd on other grounds, 436 U.S.
618 (1978); and Hubschman v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 828 (D.V.I. 1977); all
discussed in text at notes 71-145 infra,
" 409 U.S. at 268.
" Id. at 269. The Court stated:
[The law of admiralty] deals with navigational rules — rules that govern the man-
ner and direction those vessels may rightly move upon the water. When a collision
occurs or a ship founders at sea, the law of admiralty looks to those rules to deter-
mine fault, liability, and all other questions that may arise from such a catastrophe.
Through long experience, the law of the sea knows how to determine whether a
particular ship is seaworthy, and it knows the nature of maintenance and cure. It
is concerned with maritime liens, the general average, captures and prizes, limita-
tion of liability, cargo damage, and claims for salvage.
Id. at 270.
" Id. at 269-70.
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rules and concepts especially tailored to the operation of ships. 44 The Court
pointed out that a plane crash, almost without exception, is caused by factors
unrelated to the sea.'" Such causes may be "pilot error, defective design or
manufacture of airframe or engine, error of a traffic controller at an airport, or
some other cause . . . " 46 Thus, the determination of liability in such cases,
said the Court, will be based on concepts other than those of the law of admiral-
ty'"
As a second reason for its holding that maritime nexus is required, the Ex-
ecutive Jet Court expressed a concern for the independence of state government.'"
That concern should prevent the federal courts from extending admiralty juris-
diction beyond certain limits. 49 The requirement of significant relationship to
traditional maritime activity provides such a limit." When there is no such
relationship, state courts may apply their familiar concepts of state tort law
without producing any effect on maritime endeavors.''
A third reason for the Court's holding was a reluctance to take action
more properly left to Congress." If there is a need for uniformity of substantive
and procedural law governing aviation tort cases, Congress under the com-
merce clause's may enact such legislation. 54 Offering an example of congres-
sional activity with respect to aircraft and admiralty, the Court pointed out that
Congress has acted to exempt all aircraft from conformity with United States
navigation and shipping laws." Furthermore, the Court's discussion indicates
that Congress has acted to extend admiralty jurisdiction to wrongful death ac-
tions arising from airplane accidents on the high seas. 56 In like manner, accord-
ing to the Court, Congress could address any perceived need for uniformity of
aviation tort law." The Court could not effectively arrive at such uniformity by
upholding admiralty jurisdiction over those cases involving plane crashes on
the navigable waters." Therefore, it declined to find admiralty jurisdiction in
Executive jet."
" Id. at 270.
" Id.
46 Id.
" Id.
46 Id. at 272-73.
43 Id. The Court referred to its 1971 decision in Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404
U.S. 202 (1971), which had observed that the Court should be reluctant to expand admiralty
jurisdiction by simultaneously limiting the reach of state law. 404 U.S. at 12.
" See 409 U.S. at 272-74.
Id. at 283.
52 See it at 273-74.
53 U.S. CONsT. art. I, S 8, cl. 3.
54 409 U.S. at 273-74.
5' Id. at 262. The Court was referring to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C.
S 1509(a) (1976). 409 U.S. at 262 n.12.
56 Id. at 262. The Court was referring to the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C.
5§ 761-767 (1976). 409 U.S. at 262.
" Id. at 273-74.
" Id.
59 Id. at 274,
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Looking at the facts of the case before it, the Executive Jet Court found no
significant relationship with traditional maritime activity. 60
 The case involved
an event befalling a land-based aircraft flying between points in the continental
United States." Such an event, said the Court, is not related to navigation and
commerce on navigable waters." The Court rejected the argument that the
similarities between the dangers of planes crashing on the water and the
dangers of ships sinking create a maritime relationship in this case."
The Court's dicta did not, however, go so far as to indicate that all avia-
tional matters should be outside admiralty jurisdiction." The Court explicitly
refrained from deciding whether an aviation tort could ever bear a sufficient
relationship to traditional maritime activity to come within admiralty jurisdic-
tion in the absence of legislation." The Court stated that "li] t could be
argued" that a hypothetical plane crashing in mid-Atlantic en route from New
York to London might even give rise to a tort action within admiralty jurisdic-
tion. 66
 According to the Court, the plane's performance of a function tradition-
ally performed by waterborne vessels could conceivably constitute a significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity."
The Court thus refused to find admiralty jurisdition over a tort case in
which the injury had occurred on navigable waters. The refusal was due to the
absence of a connection with traditional maritime activity and to the Court's
reluctance to expand admiralty jurisdiction by correspondingly decreasing the
role of state courts and state law.
II. APPLICATION OF THE EXECUTI VE JET TEST IN
MARITIME PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES
Executive Jet was not a products liability case, but it has been regarded by
most courts as the source of a jurisdictional test for maritime torts in general."
Therefore, courts deciding maritime products liability cases have made their
determination of jurisdiction on the basis of whatever guidance was furnished
by Executive Jet, not only in the context of aviational accidents," but in that of
60 Id, at 272.
61 Id.
ss Id.
" Id. at 268-69.
6+ See id. at 271.
"
66
67 Id. Another example of a maritime function being performed by aircraft may be
found in the facts of Hornsby v. Fish Meal Co., 431 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1970), which involved a
mid-air collision over navigable waters between two light aircraft used in locating schools of fish.
409 U.S. at 271-72 n.22.
68 See note 15 supra.
69 See, e.g., Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on
other grounds, 436 U.S. 618 (1978); Hubschman v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 828
(D.V.I. 1977); both discussed in text at notes 106-45 infra.
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vessels moving on the waterways as well." The following subsections of this
note will discuss application of Executive Jet by the courts in products liability
cases.
A. Cases Involving Sinking of Vessels
In 1975 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided the jurisdictional ques-
tion in JIG the Third Corporation v. Puritan Marine Insurance Corporation" in light of
the guidance furnished by Executive Jet. The plaintiffs in JIG the Third had
owned a shrimpboat that sank in the Gulf of Mexico, 72 as a result of severe
leaking caused by a defective shaft assembly." After the sinking, the owners
sued the manufacturer for defective design and construction of the boat's shaft
assembly. 74 The suit advanced three theories of recovery." The first theory,
breach of warranty, sounded in contract. 76 The second theory, negligent design
and construction, and the third theory, strict liability, both sounded in tort."
The district court entered judgment for the plaintiff on the second theory after
a jury found that the sinking had resulted from a defect in the design or con-
struction of the boat due to defendant's negligence. 78
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit prefaced its discussion of the issue of liability
by addressing the question of whether the tort, if any, was maritime in
nature." The court reasoned that when an ocean-going vessel sinks in the Gulf
of Mexico and the sinking is allegedly tortious, there is maritime locality plus a
significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." The tort, therefore,
in accordance with Executive Jet, must be maritime in nature, although the con-
duct complained of may have been faulty design or construction and may have
occurred ashore. 8 ' The court did not consider it necessary to engage in any
analysis to arrive at its finding of admiralty jurisdiction. 82
In JIG the Third, the defect complained of had been one in a boat's shaft
assembly." In contrast, Sperry Rand Corporation v. Radio Corporation of America,"
decided by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1980, involved a defect in a
component part used in every aspect of electronic equipment." Sperry Rand,
7 ° See, e.g., JIG the Third Corp. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 519 F.2d
171 (5th Cir. 1975), discussed in text at notes 71-82 infra; Sperry Rand Corp. v. Radio Corp. of
America, 618 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1980), discussed in text at notes 84-105 infra.
7 ' 519 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976).
72 Id. at 173.
73 Id. at 173 n.2.
74 Id.
" Id.
78 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 174.
88 Id.
8 ' Id.
" See id.
as Id. at 173
84 618 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1980).
" Id, at 321.
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the plaintiff in the action, had manufactured a gyro-pilot steering system using
component parts produced by the defendants." After the grounding of the ship
in which the steering system had been installed, the vessel owners filed suit
against Sperry Rand and its insurer Liberty Mutual Insurance Company."
Those parties reached a settlement out of court prior to trial." Accordingly, the
vessel owners assigned and subrogated all of their rights of recovery to Sperry
and Liberty. 89
 Sperry and Liberty then brought a products liability action in
federal district court for economic loss against the Radio Corporation of Ameri-
ca and the other manufacturers of component parts. 9° The plaintiffs based
jurisdiction of their suit solely on the court's admiralty empowerment. 9 '
The district court dismissed the case for lack of admiralty jurisdiction." It
stated that the manufacture of small component parts, not specifically manu-
factured for incorporation in marine systems, lacked any relationship to tradi-
tional maritime activity." The district court held that the action therefore
failed to meet the locality-plus test of Executive Jet."
When the plaintiffs appealed, asserting that the action was within ad-
miralty jurisdiction," the defendants countered with two arguments. 95 First,
they contended that Sperry's suit against them involved no maritime activity,
but was merely an action seeking indemnity or contribution based on products
liability principles." They did concede, however, that in an action against
Sperry by the owner of the vessel that had run aground, there would be ad-
miralty jurisdiction since Sperry Rand had manufactured , a uniquely maritime
product. 98
Secondly, the defendants stated that a finding of admiralty jurisdiction
would be inconsistent with the Executive Jet Court's expressed desire to restrict
that jurisdiction. 99 Executive Jet was predicated on the view that admiralty
should limit itself to the special problems presented by vessels moving upon the
waterways, and not extend itself to areas where familiar concepts of state tort
law can be applied without producing any effect on maritime endeavors. too
86 Id. The allegedly defective parts included a triac semi-conductor rectifier manufac-
tured by R.C.A., a circuit amplifier manufactured by Texas Instruments, and a switch manufac-
tured by Electro-Switch. Id. at 320 n.l.
82 Id. at 320.
°° Id.
89 Id.
9° Id. On appeal, Sperry Rand argued that jurisdiction existed in its own behalf as
subrogee to the vessel owners' rights and in its own right as purchaser of the component parts. Id.
The appeals court saw no controlling significance in distinguishing either position for purposes of
admiralty jurisdiction. Id. at 320 n.2.
91 Id. at 320. Plaintiffs encountered problems with diversity jurisdiction, not specified
in the decision. See id. at 320.
92 Id.
93
 Id. at 320-21.
" Id. at 321.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. See text at notes 87-89 supra.
98 618 F.2d at 321.
99
 Id.
'°° See text at notes 41-59 supra.
1142	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 22:1133
The court in Sperry Rand rejected both arguments put forth by the defend-
ants."' With respect to the first argument, the court noted the defendants' in-
ability to cite even one case where the Executive Jet requirement of significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity was not satisfied by the sinking of,
or inflicting of damage upon, a marine vessel on navigable water. 102 Likewise,
the court was not persuaded by defendants' argument that a finding of ad-
miralty jurisdiction in the case would expand that jurisdiction to encompass the
manufacture of any product that eventually found its way into a maritime situ-
ation, no matter how unrelated in function or distribution, and would thereby
defeat the locality-plus test of Executive Jet."" The rejection of that argument
was due to the court's reluctance to reach a decision that would preclude the
litigation in federal court of all possible claims arising from the sinking of a
ship.'" The court stated that its finding would best serve the purpose of ad-
miralty jurisdiction — namely, to protect the national interest in uniformity of
law and remedies for those facing the hazards of waterborne transportation.'"
In summary, in both JIG the Third and Sperry Rand, the court reasoned that
if a marine vessel suffers harm on navigable waters, there is admiralty jurisdic-
tion for a products liability action. According to those cases, the sinking of or
damage to the vessel while it is on navigable waters satisfies the locality portion
of the Executive Jet test. Further, they state that harm to a vessel provides the
significant relationship to traditional maritime activity called for by the "plus"
portion of the Executive Jet test. Not only is it irrelevant to a finding of admiralty
jurisdiction that the design or manufacture complained of took place on land,
but after Sperry Rand, it is also irrelevant that the design or manufacture was not
that of a maritime product.
B. Accidents Involving Aviation
Cases arising from aviational accidents likewise raise the question whether
admiralty jurisdiction is appropriate for actions involving design or manufac-
ture of non-maritime products. 108 The following subsection examines two such
cases.
The first, Hubschman v. Antilles Airboats, Inc. , 107
 was decided by the Federal
District Court for the Virgin Islands in 1977. 108 A finding of admiralty jurisdic-
tion in that case was especially important to the plaintiff, because it would
allow him to bring an action after the expiration of the local statute of limita-
'°' 618 F.2d at 321-22.
02 Id. at 321.
L°' Id. at 321-22.
l°4 Id. at 322.
1 " Id., quoting Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520, 526 (5th Cir. 1973).
06
 See, e.g., Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on
other grounds, 436 U.S. 618 (1978), discussed in text at notes 133-43 infra, and Hubschman v. An-
tilles Airboats, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 828 (D.V.I. 1977), discussed in text at notes 107-32 infra.
107 440 F. Supp. 828 (D.V.I. 1977).
I00 Id.
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tions 1 °9 and to expand the remedies available to him beyond those provided by
workman's compensation."° In Hubschman, the plaintiff was a sea pilot in the
employ of defendant Antilles Airboats, Inc., which leased seaplanes from co-
defendant Caribbean Flying Boats, Inc."' The seaplane that plaintiff flew was
a Grumman "goose," a twin engine amphibian manufactured some forty
years ago. 112 In June of 1971, plaintiff was pilot of a flight with ten passsengers
between St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, and Fajardo, Puerto Rico. "3 Ten to fif-
teen minutes into the flight, both engines stopped dead without any warning." 4
The plaintiff brought the plane down on the water, a few miles northeast of the
Puerto Rican island of Culebra." 5
 It broke apart somewhere in the nose area,
and after remaining afloat five to ten minutes, went down to the bottom.'" Its
pilot the plaintiff, as well as eight of the ten passengers, survived.'"
As a result of the accident, plaintiff suffered severe permanent injuries." 8
Under the laws of the Virgin Islands, he filed a claim for Workman's Compen-
sation which was adjudicated and paid." 9
 In addition to that claim, plaintiff in
June of 1974 120
 filed in the federal district court for the Virgin Islands"' a com-
plaint against Antilles Airboats, Inc., and Caribbean Flying Boats, Inc. 122 The
complaint invoked admiralty jurisdiction" and sought, inter alia, damages
under a products liability theory from the lessor of the plane. 124
A finding of admiralty jurisdiction was necessary to the success of the
plaintiff's claim." As the court pointed out, if the plaintiff's claim had not
been brought under the umbrella of admiralty, the affirmative defense of the
statute of limitations would have barred the action.' 26 The Virgin Islands
139
 See id. at 841 n.18.
10 Id. at 833.
'" Id. at 831.
112 Id.
"3 Id. at 832.
Id.
H° Id.
Id. at 833.
n 7 Id.
"3 Id.
"9 Id.
120 Id. at 834.
121 Id. at 828.
122 Id. at 831.
123 Id. at 833.
124 Id. at 846. Plaintiff also sought an award for maintenance and cure, and his wife
sought damages for loss of consortium. Id. at 833.
123 See id. at 841 n.18.
E35
 The court referred to V.I. CODE ANN., tit. v, 31(5)A. 440 F. Supp. at 841. That
statute provides in relevant part:
$ 31. Civil actions shall only be commenced within the periods prescribed below
after the cause of action shall have accrued, except when, in special cases, a differ-
ent limitation is prescribed by statute:
(5) Two years —
(A) An action for libel, slander, assault, battery, seduction, false im-
prisonment, or for any injury to the person or rights of another not arising on con-
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statute sets out a two-year limitation period for personal injury actions. 127
Under admiralty law, however, the timeliness of the action would be deter-
mined by the doctrine of laches. 128
In order to determine whether the action was within admiralty jurisdiction
and therefore to be governed by the concept of laches, the court looked to Execu-
tive Jet and its progeny. 126 The court determined that the case met the locality-
plus criteria and was thus within admiralty jurisdiction. 130 The locality require-
ment was satisfied since the plane broke apart while on the water, and the
plaintiff received his injuries either while he was in the floating plane or after he
had been ejected from it into the water."' The court further concluded that
there was a maritime nexus, because a seaplane is different from conventional
aircraft, and because the flight was to be almost entirely over international
waters.' 32
In the second aviational case that this note discusses, Higginbotham v. Mobil
Oil Corporation," the representatives of the pilot and passengers killed in the
crash of a helicopter in the Gulf of Mexico brought suit inter alia against the
helicopter manufacturer under a products liability theory."4
 The accident had
occurred over the high seas'" about a hundred miles south of Morgan City,
Louisiana, while the helicopter had been transporting passengers from an off-
shore oil rig. 136
The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana
looked for locality and traditional maritime activity to determine the existence
of admiralty jurisdiction."7 The occurrence of the accident on the high seas,
the court said, satisfied the locality test.'" Furthermore, the court stated that
because the helicopter was performing the ordinary functions of a crewboat, it
was engaged in a maritime activity.'" The activity of the helicopter performing
the functions of a crewboat was distinguished from the activity of the aircraft
flying between points in the continental United States in Executive Jet.'" Thus,
the two requirements of the locality-plus test were satisfied."' The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that the district court's conclusion was correct under
tract and not herein especially enumerated . . . .
Id.
' 22 Id.
'" Id.
26 440 F. Supp. at 839.
' 30 Id. at 840.
' 31 Id.
142 ,rd .
1 " Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D. La. 1973), aff'd in rele-
vant part, 545 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
"4 357 F. Supp. at 1166, 1167.
"6
 Id. at 1167.
196 Id. at 1166.
1 " Id. at 1167.
136
 Id.
"6 Id.
' 4° Id.
'" Id.
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Executive Jet.'" It expressed the view that even if the aircraft initially took off
from or was normally based within the continental United States, admiralty
jurisdiction "is not automatically ousted. "143
Both Higginbotham and Hubschman indicate that if a plane crashes on
navigable waters while it is performing a function traditionally assigned to
ships or boats, then an action alleging defective design or manufacture of the
plane or its parts is within admiralty jurisdiction.'" That finding of jurisdiction
is due to the courts' application of a locality-plus test derived from the holding
in Executive Jet.'"
III. INADEQUACIES OF THE LOCALITY-PLUS TEST
As a result of the courts' use and interpretation of the locality-plus test,
Sperry Rand, Hubschman, and Higginbotham were all brought within admiralty
jurisdiction, although they might have been addressed more appropriately by
the law of the states. This section of the note will set forth the view that the use
of the locality-plus test may lead to undesirable results for two reasons. First,
locality is not always an accurate indicator of whether an action should be
within admiralty jurisdiction. Second, the courts' interpretation of the mean-
ing of maritime nexus has been excessively broad.
The inclusion of locality as a part of the jurisdicitonal test presents the dis-
advantage that the occurrence of injury on water rather than on land is often
fortuitous. This element of chance is especially apparent in products liability
litigation. Many products can cause harm either on or off the navigable waters.
If the purpose of the resulting litigation is to answer the question whether there
was a defect in the design or manufacture of the product, then the locality —
land or water — of the injury would seem to be irrelevant to the question. As
the Supreme Court pointed out in Executive Jet, it was not to address such
general questions of a non-maritime nature that admiralty jurisdiction and law
have developed.' 46
The requirement of maritime locality can actually hinder an appropriate
exercise of admiralty jurisdiction. The number of times that courts have had to
make exceptions to the locality test, when the tort had no maritime locality but
did bear a relationship to maritime activity, is an indictment of that element of
the test.'" For example, courts have allowed within admiralty jurisdiction ac-
tions by seamen for injuries sustained wholly on land, when those injuries were
142 545 F.2d at 424
1 " Id. The court made reference to Dearborn Marine Serv., Inc. v. Chambers & Ken-
nedy, 499 F.2d 263, 272 n.17 (5th Cir. 1974) and Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520, 523-24
(9th Cir. 1974).
I" See text at notes 107-43 supra.
'" Id.
146 See 409 U.S. at 270. Speaking of aviational accidents, the Court said that factual and
conceptual inquiries regarding causes of injury such as the "defective design or manufacture of
airframe or engine" are unfamiliar to the law of admiralty. Id.
14 ' Id. at 259.
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caused by defects in the ship or its gear.'" The inappropriateness of locality as
a factor in the test is shown further by the necessity Congress has perceived to
pass legislation to bring within admiralty jurisdiction some tort actions involv-
ing injury to persons or property on land. For example, the Extension of Ad-
miralty Jurisdiction Act, passed in 1948,'" provides that the admiralty juris-
diction of the United States shall extend to injuries caused by a vessel on navi-
gable waters "notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consum-
mated on land." 13° The act was passed specifically to overrule cases such as
The Plymouth's' that would have excluded such cases arising from damage by
ships to land structures.'" Thus, non-maritime locality by itself should not bar
exercise of admiralty jurisdiction.
With respect to the second portion of the test, the courts have been correct
in stating that they should find a significant relationship with traditional mari-
time activity in order to exercise admiralty jurisdiction. Yet, in some cases they
have been willing to expand to an excessive extent their understanding of what
the term encompasses. To state, as the court in Sperry did, that any allegation of
harm to a ship on navigable waters is enough to create a significant relationship
with maritime activity,'" leads to a conclusion that any defect in design or
manufacture of a product that harms a vessel is within admiralty jurisdiction.
This conclusion is too sweeping. Under such reasoning, a defect in the design
or manufacture of an electric frying pan could give rise to an admiralty action if
the wiring of the pan caused a fire damaging a ship. An action arising from that
sort of circumstance does not need a federal forum or the application of a
special body of federal maritime law. It would be fully within the competence
and expertise of a state court to try such a case applying its own body of law.
Likewise, the Sperry case would have been fully within the competence of a state
court.
In regard to aviation cases such as Hubschman, it is not clear why the per-
formance by an instrumentality other than a waterborne vessel of a function
traditionally performed by waterborne vessels creates a significant relationship
to traditional maritime activity. If freight of a type that would at one time have
been transported between two cities by river transport today travels by truck or
railroad, no one would seriously suggest that an accident involving such a truck
would give rise to an action within admiralty jurisdiction, even if by some
chance the truck were to crash in a river. The truck's movements are not
directly related to the waterborne shipping business that the law of admiralty
has been developed to regulate.
Thus, the courts in some instances have applied a locality-plus test to ex-
1" Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206, 214-15 (1963). See also Strika v.
Netherlands Ministry of Traffic, 185 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1950).
13' 46 U.S.C. S 740 (1976).
"0 Id.
"' 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865). See note 11 supra.
"2 Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 260.
133 See text at notes 84-105 supra.
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pand the reach of admiralty jurisdiction. In doing so, they have not sufficiently
taken into account whether such expansion is in accordance with the purposes
underlying admiralty jurisdiction. Regulation of the shipping industry is close
to the conduct of foreign affairs. There is a need for a uniform body of laws,
consistent with the laws of other maritime nations for the conduct of the ship-
ping business.'" Yet matters not directly and immediately connected with
navigation or commerce by water should be excluded.'" The test suggested in
the following section is intended to include only those causes of action directly
related to waterborne shipping.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
The test for admiralty jurisdiction over tort actions should be based solely
on the presence of a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. In
the area of products liability litigation, both the injury and the design or manu-
facture causing the injury should bear a significant relationship to traditional
maritime activity. The requirement that the injury bear such a relationship
would exclude most personal injuries to individuals other than seamen. In-
juries to pleasure boaters and swimmers, even if caused by defective boats,
would be governed by state law in state courts. The requirement that design or
manufacture bear a maritime relationship would exclude even injuries to
seamen if caused by an instrumentality not connected with maritime endeavor.
Thus a seaman injured by a defective electric razor would have to conduct his
litigation in state court under state law. Those manufacturers producing unique-
ly maritime products could expect the possibility of involvement in actions
within admiralty jurisdiciton. Other manufacturers, such as those of aircraft,
of component parts used generally in a variety of industries, and of miscellane-
ous non-maritime products would not face the possibility of such involvement.
The element of fortuitousness found in some of the cases discussed in this note
would be removed. Those maritime plaintiffs to whom admiralty jurisdiction
has traditionally given a choice of federal or state forum would still have that
choice. But those to whom the happenstance of a defective product's injury to a
person on the water gave such a choice would not. Actions that would not
benefit from special expertise of judges experienced in maritime matters would
fall within the latter excluded category.
This test can be applied in full compliance with the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Executive Jet. Although most lower federal courts addressing the issue
have interpreted Executive Jet as instituting a locality-plus test instead of the
locality test, that decision, which is highly critical of the locality test, can also
1♦ See Richards v. Blake Builders Supply, Inc., 528 F 2c1 745, 747 (4th Cir. 1975).
" 5 See Thames Towboat Co. v. The Schooner "Francis McDonald," 254 U.S. 242,
244-48 (1920) (contracts for the construction of ships have traditionally been excluded from ad-
miralty jurisdiction because they are not directly and immediately connected with navigation or
commerce by water).
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be interpreted as simply abolishing the requirement of locality. 156
 Executive Jet
does not itself explicitly advocate a locality-plus test. The decision does state a
conclusion by the Court "that maritime locality alone is not a sufficient
predicate for admiralty jurisdiction in aviation tort cases."'" Yet nowhere in
its opinion does the Court state that locality is a necessary element. In fact, the
Court was highly critical of reliance on locality as a factor determinative of ad-
miralty jurisdiction.ma The Court pointed out that there has existed a recogni-
tion that "in determining whether there is admiralty jurisdiciton over . . .
torts, reliance on the relationship of the wrong to traditional maritime activity
is often more sensible and more consonant with the purposes of maritime law
than is a purely mechanical application of the locality test. " 159
 Furthermore,
the Court did not present a general definition of significant relationship to tra-
ditional maritime activity.' 60 Thus, application of the definition of that rela-
tionship submitted here with respect to products liability cases would be con-
sistent with the letter and spirit of Executive Jet.
CONCLUSION
For the determination of admiralty jurisdiction over products liability ac-
tions, courts have used a locality-plus test. That test requires maritime locality
of harm, plus a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. Courts
have applied and interpreted the test so as to include within admiralty jurisdic-
tion actions involving defects in non-maritime products.
The test proposed in this note is one based solely on the presence of a
significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. Thus, the element of
fortuitousness would be removed from this area of products liability litigation.
In that area, the test should be whether the injury and the design or manufac-
ture complained of bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activi-
ty.
JOHN R. PIERCE
156 Robertson, Injuries to Marine Petroleum Workers: A Plea for Radical Simplification, 55 TEX.
L. REV. 973, 1009-10 (1977). Cf. Verrett v. Offshore Crews, Inc., 332 So. 2d 292, 298 (La. App.
1976) ( Verrett court stating that Executive Jet had downplayed the importance of locality as a factor
in determining the existence of admiralty jurisdiction).
177 409 U.S. at 261.
159 Id. at 255-61.
159 Id, at 261.
' 6° See id. at 268-74.
